Russia’s Systematic Theft of Ukrainian Coal

Systematic Russian Theft of Ukraine's Mineral Wealth Through Coal Exploitation

Introduction and Background

Since the onset of Russia’s aggression in 2014, Ukraine’s coal-rich Donbas region (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) has been subject to systematic resource looting. Dozens of Ukrainian state and private coal mines in occupied territories have been seized and integrated into the occupiers’ economykyivindependent.com. This “resource colonization” intensified after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, as Moscow shifted from merely denying Ukraine access to its mineral wealth to actively extracting and selling these resources abroadkyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. By mid-2022, an estimated 63% of Ukraine’s coal deposits (and a large share of other minerals) were under Russian controlkyivindependent.com, depriving Kyiv of billions in revenue and energy supply. Russian-installed authorities and associated oligarchs have taken over mines under the pretext of “investment” but in reality have exploited the mines without meaningful upkeep, leading to dangerous conditions and environmental hazardsjfp.org.uajfp.org.ua. The following report details evidence of coal theft from these occupied mines, the logistics of smuggling coal out via ports and ships, the key companies and individuals involved, the international buyers enabling this illicit trade, the harsh conditions for miners under occupation, the legal violations incurred, and the broader economic and geopolitical impacts.

Seizure of Coal Mines in Occupied Donbas (2014–2023)

Evidence of Mine Takeovers: From 2014 onward, local proxy authorities in the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk “People’s Republics” (DNR/LNR) took control of dozens of coal mines, ranging from small pits to some of Ukraine’s largest mineskyivindependent.com. Many mines belonging to Ukraine’s state coal companies (e.g. Shakhtarskantratsyt, Sverdlovskanthracite, etc.) or private firms (such as those of Rinat Akhmetov’s DTEK) were forcibly “nationalized” by the occupiers. In 2017, after a trade blockade, the DNR/LNR authorities seized remaining Ukrainian-run mines and handed them to cronies like Serhiy Kurchenko (a fugitive Ukrainian oligarch)jfp.org.ua. Kurchenko’s Vneshtorgservice firm reportedly managed many mines and steel mills, squeezing out all profits while neglecting workers’ wages and maintenancejfp.org.ua. As a result, by 2018 at least 36 mines had been abandoned or flooded due to lack of pumping and upkeepjfp.org.ua. Miners from towns like Yenakiieve described how occupation authorities ordered them to shut down drainage systems, causing shafts to fill with waterjfp.org.uajfp.org.ua. This “maximally exploit and abandon” approach led to rising methane and radiation risks – an ecological disaster in the makingjfp.org.uajfp.org.ua.

New ‘Investment’ Scheme (2023–2024): Facing decaying infrastructure and falling output, the Kremlin introduced an “investment model” in 2023–24 to formally transfer many occupied mines to Russian companies. Under this scheme (essentially legalized theft), about 20 seized Ukrainian coal mines plus related coal processing plants were leased or sold to five private firms from Russiakyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. These companies – often hastily formed and lacking mining experience – were ostensibly tasked with investing in and operating the mines. In reality, most focused on ramping up illicit exports of stolen coal. The arrangement has been likened to a pawn-shop resale of stolen goods: the mines still legally belong to Ukraine and their rightful owners, but occupiers have handed them to Russian “investors” to profit from Ukraine’s mineral wealthkyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com.

Notable Mine Transfers: On Feb. 9, 2024, the first five mines (in occupied Luhansk oblast) were transferred to a Russian-registered firm called Donskie Ugli Trade Housekyivindependent.com. By late 2024, Donskie Ugli controlled as many as 10 coal mines and 4 coal enrichment plants in Luhanskkyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. In April 2024, another Russian company, Impex-Don, took over four mines in occupied Donetsk oblastkyivindependent.com. Other mines were given to entities like the Rodina Industrial Group (linked to ex-Party of Regions official Oleksandr Klymenko) and a Moscow firm “Specialist LLC” tied to Viktor Medvedchuk’s associateskyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. Notably, one of the Donetsk assets, the Shakhtarska-Hlyboka mine along with an enrichment plant, was leased to Specialist LLC, a company connected to Medvedchuk’s circle, illustrating how Ukraine’s fugitive elites and Moscow cronies carved up the spoilskyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com.

Logistics of Coal Smuggling: Ports, Vessels, and Evasion Tactics

Once extracted, the coal from occupied mines is illegally transported out of Ukraine, primarily through the Russian-controlled port of Mariupol on the Sea of Azov. The logistics operation mimics a smuggling pipeline with multiple tactics to evade detection:

• Occupied Port of Mariupol: Mariupol, a major metallurgical and export hub before the war, fell under Russian occupation in May 2022. By 2024, Mariupol’s port had become a key node for shipping stolen Donbas coal. Russian occupation authorities even illegally reopened and operated the port – including repairing rail links and using seized locomotives – to enable bulk transport of looted coal and other goodsukrinform.netukrinform.net. Ukrainian intelligence described this as turning Mariupol into a “logistics hub” for plundered resourcesukrinform.net. According to Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service, in 2024–2025 Russia exported at least 120,000 tons of coking coal through Mariupol port, using it to funnel Donbas coal into Russia’s supply chainen.cfts.org.uaen.cfts.org.ua. This was part of a deliberate strategy to fuel Russia’s economy (and war industry) with stolen Ukrainian mineralsen.cfts.org.ua.

• Ships Involved – Bulk Carriers with AIS Dark: The coal is loaded onto Russian-flagged bulk cargo vessels that call at Mariupol. Prominent examples include ALFA-1, ALFA M, ALPHA HERMES, VICTORIA K, and VICTORIA V – all ships that have repeatedly docked in Mariupol under Russian control. During 2024–25, these five vessels alone carried out the 120,000 tons of stolen coal shipments: Alfa-1 transported over 20,000 tons, Alfa M ~40,000 tons, Alpha Hermes >5,000 tons, Victoria K >20,000 tons, and Victoria V >**35,000 tonsszru.gov.ua*. All five fly the Russian flag (registered in Taganrog, Russia) and are operated by Russian or proxy-owned companiesszru.gov.uaszru.gov.ua. For instance, Alfa-1 and Alfa M are owned by Nika Shipping LLC (an entity based in occupied Donetsk), while Alpha Hermes is owned by Alfa LLC of Rostov, and the Victoria vessels by Sibmarket LLC of Irkutskszru.gov.uaszru.gov.ua. A Rostov-based firm, Krechet LLC, serves as the fleet’s operating company, and all are insured by Russian insurers, reflecting a state-supported smuggling fleetszru.gov.uaszru.gov.ua.

• Turning Off AIS and Hiding Identities: To evade tracking, these ships routinely disable or obscure their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders when near Mariupol. For example, in November 2023 a Mariupol city official reported a Russian bulk carrier loading 8–9,000 tons of coal with “all identifiers off”, meaning no AIS signal or name broadcastukrinform.net. This going dark tactic is meant to prevent global maritime monitors from noticing unauthorized calls at a closed Ukrainian port. In some cases, ships also sail under false callsigns or names in documentation. Ukrainian observers have dubbed these vessels “ghost ships” that appear only briefly on AIS (if at all) once they reach Russian ports, having effectively snuck out of Mariupol under radarukrinform.net. The lack of AIS data and the closed nature of Azov Sea shipping make independent verification challenging, aiding the smugglers.

• Transshipment and Document Fraud: Another evasion method is re-routing via a Russian port to launder the cargo’s origin. Temryuk, a port in Krasnodar Krai (Russia), has been used for this purpose. In one documented case, a ship loaded with stolen Ukrainian metallurgical coke in Mariupol later stopped in Temryuk, where a second set of cargo papers was issued falsely stating the coal was loaded in Russiakyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. Investigators obtained two cargo declarations for the same shipment – one from Mariupol and a week-later “duplicate” from Temryuk – clearly indicating fraudulent paperworkkyivindependent.com. “They deliberately enter a Russian port to counterfeit documents,” explained a Ukrainian analyst of the schemekyivindependent.com. By the time the vessel leaves Temryuk for international waters, it carries Russian customs forms and bills of lading, obscuring the coal’s true (Ukrainian) originkyivindependent.com. Such falsified documents make it easier to pass off the coal as a legitimate Russian export, duping buyers or complicit authorities.

• Alternate Routes: While Mariupol is the primary gateway, occupiers have explored other routes to export Donbas coal. The Russian-installed authorities publicly discussed exporting through the Russian Azov ports of Taganrog and Rostov-on-Don, and even by rail through Azerbaijan to Iran as potential corridorskyivindependent.com. In August 2024, the Russia-controlled Rodina group boasted it was negotiating coal sales to Turkey, and soon after, occupation officials confirmed plans to ship coal via Mariupol and possibly via those Russian portskyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. Overland, there is evidence of train convoys moving coal north into Russia proper – the stolen coal can be mixed with Russian-mined coal and exported from Russian Black Sea ports (like Novorossiysk) or sent overland to clients. This overland smuggling is harder to quantify but was reported by Ukraine’s intelligence in mid-2023: roughly 160,000 tons of Donbas coal were sent into Russia and onward to foreign markets between Feb–July 2023kyivindependent.com.

Overall, these logistics point to a shadow supply chain. Russia has effectively created a “black market” infrastructure to monetize Ukrainian natural resourcesszru.gov.ua. The combination of AIS-dark ships, falsified manifests, and intermediary ports shows a high level of coordination to systematically steal coal on an industrial scale while evading sanctions and scrutiny.

Key Companies and Individuals Involved in the Coal Theft

Multiple entities – both newly formed companies and figures tied to the Russian and ex-Ukrainian elite – have profited from the trafficking of Donbas coal. Below are profiles of the key companies identified in investigative reports and official records as central players in this illicit trade:

Donskie Ugli Trade House (“Don Coal” Trade House)

Diagram illustrating how the occupied Shakhtarska-Hlyboka mine (legally owned by a Ukrainian state entity) was leased to “Specialist LLC,” a Moscow company linked to Viktor Medvedchuk’s associateskyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. Medvedchuk’s network and other Kremlin-aligned “investors” have taken over numerous Donbas mines under the guise of private management.

Donskie Ugli (translated “Don Coals”) is a Russia-registered company that became the largest private operator of seized Ukrainian coal mines. In early 2024, it was handed control of around ten Luhansk region mines (plus several coal prep plants) by occupation authoritieskyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. Donskie Ugli’s emergence is closely tied to Viktor Medvedchuk, Putin’s longtime ally in Ukraine. When five mines were first leased to Donskie Ugli in February 2024, the company was led by Sergey Lisogor, a Russian citizen whose phone contacts linked him to a Medvedchuk-associated firmkyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. In fact, Lisogor (along with two Donskie Ugli shareholders) had been sanctioned by Ukraine in 2021 alongside Medvedchukkyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com, indicating he was part of Medvedchuk’s business orbit. Another early backer was Vitaliy Donchenko, a Russian who held a 5% share; Ukraine’s SBU security service has put Donchenko on a wanted list for his role in looting these mineskyivindependent.com. Medvedchuk himself, accused of treason, was handed over to Russia in a prisoner swap in 2022, but Ukrainian officials suspect he or his proxies remain de facto beneficiaries of Donskie Uglikyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com.

On paper, Donskie Ugli Trade House is now officially owned and directed by Oleg Knyazev, a Russian ex-regional official (former Astrakhan Oblast governor)kyivindependent.com. Knyazev’s annual income was only a few million rubles – not nearly enough to buy a portfolio of mines – suggesting he is a figureheadkyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. Media in occupied Luhansk refer to him as the “director” rather than owner. Under Knyazev/Lisogor’s management, Donskie Ugli set up export channels for coal. By mid-2024 the company publicly said it was negotiating sales to Turkey, China, India, Iran, Uzbekistan, and Malaysiakyivindependent.com. Indeed, Ukrainian customs leaks show Donskie Ugli (through intermediaries) was already shipping coal to Turkey by 2024kyivindependent.com. In sum, Donskie Ugli appears to be a front company enabling Medvedchuk’s camp and Russian partners to monetize the Luhansk coal assets. Ukrainian prosecutors have opened criminal cases into its activitieskyivindependent.com, viewing it as a vehicle for pillage of state property.

Impex-Don LLC

Impex-Don is another Moscow-registered firm that became a major “investor” in occupied coal mines. In April 2024, Impex-Don received control of four coal mines in occupied Donetsk oblast, making it the second-largest private beneficiary after Donskie Uglikyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. Impex-Don is notably linked to the Gryzlov family – a prominent business clan from Rostov-on-Don, Russiakyivindependent.com. The Gryzlovs own the Rostov seaport and other enterprises, suggesting Impex-Don was backed by an established Russian logistics empire. As soon as the mines were transferred, new figures appeared in Impex-Don’s leadership. Yulia Maksimova (Pakreeva), a Russian woman, joined Impex-Don’s board in 2024kyivindependent.com. Maksimova was previously the head of Russia’s state construction agency (RosKapStroy) in occupied Mariupol, working under Deputy PM Marat Khusnullin to integrate occupied territorieskyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. Under her watch, Mariupol’s port operations were illegally restored for Russian usekyivindependent.com. Another key figure was Vladimir Pakreev (Maksimova’s husband), who simultaneously sat as a “deputy” in the Russian-installed separatist parliament of Donetskkyivindependent.com. Pakreev served as Impex-Don’s CEO in 2024, effectively representing local proxy interests within the companykyivindependent.com.

Impex-Don’s business model was to invest some funds to restart the mines (which had suffered neglect) in exchange for lucrative export rights. The company pledged the equivalent of $175 million in investment over five years and in turn even received subsidies from the occupation administration – for example, nearly $2 million to buy mining equipmentkyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. This underscores how closely Russian authorities worked with Impex-Don. By late 2024, Impex-Don was openly exporting coal abroad: its representative Yulia Maksimova confirmed to journalists that shipments of seized Ukrainian coal had begun (she declined to give details)kyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. Internal data shows Impex-Don sold some of its coal via foreign intermediaries like Green Rabbit (see below) in 2023kyivindependent.com. However, by early 2025, reports emerged that Impex-Don was closing some mines due to low global coal prices and high maintenance costskyivindependent.com. Even so, Impex-Don retains control of certain profitable mines and remains a conduit for exporting stolen coal. The Gryzlov family’s involvement suggests the Kremlin rewarded them with Donbas assets, tying regional Russian business interests to the war economy.

Green Rabbit Limited (Hong Kong)

Green Rabbit Ltd. is a shadowy trading company registered in Hong Kong that has played a pivotal role as an international broker for stolen Ukrainian coal. Leaked customs records and investigative reporting have exposed Green Rabbit as a key “exporter” of coal, coke, and even grain from occupied Donbaskyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. The company drew attention in early 2024 when Russian outlet iStories revealed it was originally owned by Muslim Temerkayev, a Russian businessman with high-level connectionskyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. Temerkayev served as an adviser to Marat Kabaev – who is the father of Alina Kabaeva (Vladimir Putin’s reputed partner)kyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. In other words, Green Rabbit was linked to Putin’s inner circle via the Kabaeva family. Hong Kong corporate filings confirmed Temerkayev as the owner, using his Moscow addressistories.media.

After this exposure, Green Rabbit hastily changed its shareholder: by late 2024 the owner became Andrey Rashchupkin, a little-known man originally from Donetsk who took Russian citizenshipkyivindependent.com. When contacted by journalists, Rashchupkin refused to explain how he came to own the companykyivindependent.com. Despite the ownership shuffle, Green Rabbit’s activity continued unabated. In 2023 alone, Green Rabbit sold about 88,000 tons of coal, coke, and iron ore sourced from occupied territories – earning roughly 1.2 billion rubles in revenueistories.media. Most of this went to Turkey, with smaller volumes to Albania, among other destinationsistories.media. Green Rabbit’s documents list it as the shipper on many Azov Sea export cargos. For example, it chartered a vessel Sv. Nikolay to carry a batch of stolen Ukrainian coke from Mariupol; that ship’s route (Mariupol → Temryuk → onward) was arranged by Green Rabbit to get the cargo to marketkyivindependent.com. Customs data from 2023–24 (though incomplete) shows Green Rabbit repeatedly purchasing coal from the occupied-mine operators – including direct buys from Donskie Ugli Trade House and Impex-Don – and then delivering that coal to Turkish buyerskyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com.

Intriguingly, Green Rabbit also acted as a conduit for metallurgical coke produced in occupied Donetsk (at the Yasinovatsky Coke Plant controlled by another pro-Russian oligarch’s group)kyivindependent.com. It purchased coke via a firm called Soyuzmetallservice and exported it, indicating the breadth of commodities being plundered. Investigators note that Green Rabbit was essentially a front company: initially fronting for Temerkayev (and by extension, potentially Putin’s entourage), and later possibly for Donbas locals-turned-collaborators like Rashchupkinkyivindependent.com. The company’s use of a Hong Kong registration provided a veneer of legitimacy and a way to operate in USD/EUR and global trade channels despite sanctions. Notably, Green Rabbit has been implicated in grain theft as well, showing the model of a multipurpose trading house for looted Ukrainian goodskyivindependent.com. It remains active into 2024–25, as evidenced by a Green Rabbit-arranged shipment of coke in April 2025 (on the vessel Alpha Helios, which sailed from Mariupol to Temryuk en route to Algeria)kyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com.

Other Entities and Individuals

In addition to the above, several other companies form part of this illicit supply chain:

• Energoresurs (Rostov-on-Don): A Russian fuel trading company that, according to investigations, exported the largest share of stolen Donbas coal in 2022–24kyivindependent.com. Energoresurs shipped nearly 500,000 tons of occupied Donbas coal abroad in 2023–24kyivindependent.com, primarily to Turkey. While officially owned by a nominal figure, Energoresurs is reportedly controlled by Oleksandr Yanukovych – the son of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovychkyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. Oleksandr Yanukovych had extensive coal business in eastern Ukraine and fled to Russia in 2014; through Energoresurs, he allegedly continues to profit from Donbas coal. The scheme involves Energoresurs buying coal from the occupied mines (often via local shell companies), declaring it as “Russian” origin, then selling it to an offshore intermediary (Energy Union in the British Virgin Islands) at a low transfer price (~$60/ton) before final resalekyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. This structure minimizes customs duties and conceals the true source. Notably, Energoresurs had previously (pre-2022) even sold Donbas-origin coal into EU countries like Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, but since the full invasion it ships almost exclusively to Turkeykyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. The Ukrainian government has highlighted Energoresurs as a prime example of how Yanukovych’s family made “billions” from stolen coalkyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com.

• Florence LLC (Florance): A Moscow-based logistics firm that appears frequently in coal transport documents. Reuters reported that Florance arranges transport of coal from occupied Donbasistories.media. The investigative project “Sistema” uncovered that Florance LLC is linked to Viktor Medvedchuk’s networkistories.media. Indeed, Florance often appears as the consignee for coal shipments brokered through complex chains. For example, a recent exposé showed that a Russian coal giant (Stroyservice JSC, owned by oligarch Dmitry Nikolaev) was covertly supplying coking coal to occupied Donbas via two or three intermediary firms, with Florance as the final consigneeeureporter.coeureporter.co. Florance effectively functions as the receiver of coal on behalf of the occupied territories (and likely handles onward delivery into Donbas or exports). The company was flagged by U.S. sanctions in 2023 for its role in Russia’s war logistics. Its involvement illustrates the broader web of “gasket” companies facilitating illicit trade, sometimes even using Russian domestic coal mixed with Donbas coal to muddy originseureporter.coeureporter.co.

• Nika Shipping LLC and Sibmarket LLC: These are shipping companies directly responsible for the vessels mentioned earlier. Nika Shipping, based in Donetsk (occupied DNR), is listed as the owner of Alfa-1 and Alfa M shipsszru.gov.uaszru.gov.ua. Sibmarket LLC, registered in Irkutsk, Russia, owns Victoria K and Victoria Vszru.gov.uaszru.gov.ua. Both appear to be shell companies created to own ships that haul contraband. Their vessels are managed by Krechet LLC (Rostov). The fact that one ship owner is “DPR”-based indicates the pseudo-authorities in Donetsk have their own maritime front company – effectively integrating the stolen coal operation with the occupation regime’s structures.

• Rodina Industrial Group / Oleksandr Klymenko: Klymenko is a former Ukrainian minister under Yanukovych, now exiled in Russia, who leads the Rodina group. In 2022–23, he obtained control of the Yasinovka Coke Plant in occupied Donetsk and possibly some mines, coming in third in terms of assets acquiredkyivindependent.com. Rodina’s website openly discussed plans to export coal to Turkeykyivindependent.com. Klymenko’s group has also been involved in illicit metals exports. This demonstrates the convergence of former Yanukovych-era elites in looting operations, alongside Russian oligarchs.

In summary, the theft of Ukrainian coal is enabled by a network of interlocking entities: local proxy companies holding the mines, Russian logistics firms, offshore shell companies, and well-connected individuals (from Medvedchuk and Yanukovych’s circles to Russian oligarchs like Nikolaev). Each plays a role in turning Donbas coal into cash for the occupying power. Ukraine’s authorities have been actively tracing these connections, imposing sanctions on many of these companies/figures and sharing intelligence to potentially prosecute them for war crimes and smuggling.

International Buyers and Destinations of Stolen Coal

A crucial element of this scheme is the foreign markets that purchase the illicit coal – either unwittingly or by turning a blind eye. Investigations reveal that Turkey is by far the largest known buyer of coal exported from occupied Donbas.

• Turkey’s Role: Despite being a NATO member and publicly supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, Turkey has become the top destination for this coal. A Reuters investigation (confirmed by UK intelligence) found that from February to July 2023 about 160,400 tonnes of coal from Russian-occupied Donetsk and Luhansk were imported by Turkeykyivindependent.com. This coal, worth at least $14 million, was documented in Russian customs records as coming from the occupied territories but apparently passed Turkish customs without issuekyivindependent.com. Since the EU, UK, and others banned Russian coal imports in 2022, Russia has relied on “friendly” countries, and Turkey in particular, to absorb its coal exports – including those originating in Ukraine. Turkish companies (often traders and steelmakers) likely buy the coal at discounted rates. Turkey’s government, which has not joined Western sanctions, has so far not enforced any ban on coal that is labeled as Russian, even if it secretly comes from Donbas. This effectively makes Turkey a facilitator of the trade. Ukrainian officials have quietly raised concerns, and this mirrors Turkey’s import of stolen Ukrainian grain – exploiting a grey zone in enforcement. The scale is significant: by 2024, nearly all international shipments of Donbas coal were going to Turkeykyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. Turkey’s demand for coking coal (for its steel industry) and cheaper thermal coal has provided a ready market.

• Other Buyers: Aside from Turkey, a few other countries have been identified. As noted, Albania received some shipments of coal/coke from Green Rabbit in 2023istories.media. Albania is a minor coal consumer, which suggests these may have been small opportunistic deals. Montenegro and other Balkans were rumored markets in earlier years, though concrete data is sparse. Eastern European countries like Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland had inadvertently imported some Donbas coal in 2015–2018 (often mixed with Russian coal), but since the war and sanctions, the EU is largely off-limits. There are indications that China and India have been approached: occupation officials claimed in late 2024 that they were in talks with buyers in China, India, Iran, and Malaysia for Donbas coalkyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. However, it’s unclear if any shipments to those countries materialized, or if it was aspirational. Both China and India do import large volumes of Russian coal; they could unknowingly receive some Donbas-origin coal if it’s blended into Russian exports. Iran could receive some via the Russia–Azerbaijan rail route if that plan proceededkyivindependent.com.

• Willful Blindness and Evasion: Many of these transactions exploit the difficulty of tracing coal origins. For example, by the time coal reaches a Turkish port, its papers may show a Russian exporter and a Russian port of loading (like Temryuk or Taganrog) thanks to the falsification tactics described. Thus, a Turkish buyer can claim plausible deniability, asserting they bought “Russian” coal. Some traders undoubtedly know the real origin but choose to overlook it for profit. The same goes for authorities – e.g., Hong Kong (where Green Rabbit was registered) did not prevent the company’s activities until media exposure forced a shareholder changekyivindependent.com. Similarly, Cyprus and BVI entities (like Energy Union and SL Holdings linked to Yanukovych’s schemes) provided offshore financial services to launder the profitskyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. These countries haven’t cracked down on such shell companies. Moscow’s complicity is also clear: Russian railways, ports, and customs offices are issuing documents and moving this coal, effectively integrating stolen Ukrainian coal into Russia’s export stream. This points to an official policy of resource theft.

In essence, countries that have not imposed strict sanctions on Russian commodities – notably Turkey – have become the end-markets for pillaged Ukrainian coal. This has economic and diplomatic implications: it undermines sanctions and provides Russia (and its proxies) with revenue to continue the war. Western officials and the UN have been informed of these “conflict resource” flows, but enforcement is challenging unless buyer countries cooperate. Ukraine has urged all nations to recognize coal (and grain, metals) from occupied territories as stolen goods and block their import, but as of 2025, gaps remain that the smugglers are exploiting.

Working Conditions and Labor Exploitation in Occupied Mines

Under Russian occupation and proxy management, conditions for coal miners in Donbas have deteriorated severely. Credible reports from within the occupied regions indicate a climate of labor exploitation, safety negligence, and human rights abuses:

• Unpaid Wages and Poverty: Many miners who stayed in DNR/LNR-held mines went unpaid for months, sometimes years. Testimonies collected by activists in 2018–2020 describe miners receiving only meager rations or “IOUs” instead of full salariesdialog.uapobedarf.ru. A Ukrainian blogger dubbed the occupied Donetsk miners “slaves working for scraps” under the proxy regimedialog.ua. The situation did not improve with the arrival of Russian “investors.” While companies like Donskie Ugli and Impex-Don promised investments, there is little evidence of substantial wage increases. In fact, by 2025 some mines were being shuttered by these firms, putting miners out of work entirelykyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. Those still employed often depend on irregular payments from the occupation administration. This has caused widespread poverty in mining towns that were once relatively prosperous under Ukrainian administration.

• Dangerous and Degrading Work: Safety standards in occupied mines have plummeted. Ukraine’s trade unions and coal industry officials report that many occupied mines lack proper ventilation, gas detection, and rock-fall prevention, as equipment broke down and was not replaced. The flooding of mines (due to halted pumping) has created risk of methane explosions in adjacent mines that are still operating, as water pushes gas into connected shaftsjfp.org.uajfp.org.ua. Indeed, there have been numerous accidents and fatalities in these mines since 2014 that go unreported internationally. For instance, the Zasyadko mine in Donetsk (notorious for accidents) suffered a deadly blast in 2015 under separatist control. Miners also face toxic exposure; an OSCE report noted rising concentrations of mercury, cadmium, and radioactive materials in groundwater due to flooded mines – potentially impacting drinking water for mining communitiesjfp.org.ua. The occupational health situation is dire, with minimal oversight by the de facto authorities. Mine workers in occupied territory lack any independent labor unions or legal recourse. Complaining can result in being fired or even accused of disloyalty.

• Forced Labor and Conscription: There is evidence that the occupation authorities have coerced some miners into work or military service. In 2022, during Russia’s mobilization, hundreds of miners were forcibly conscripted from Luhansk mines into the Russian army, according to Ukraine’s officials (reports mentioned ~430 mine workers drafted)newsweek.com. This not only violated their rights but also left mines short-staffed. Furthermore, inmates from local prisons have allegedly been used as labor in certain mines (a practice reminiscent of Soviet times). While hard documentation is scarce, anecdotal reports suggest that some mining operations turned to prison labor or “civil mobilization” of locals to keep mines running despite labor shortages. This amounts to exploitation of vulnerable workers under threat of force.

• Ecological and Community Impact: The reckless exploitation has hurt not just workers but entire communities. As mines flood and infrastructure decays, towns face pollution and the loss of their economic lifeline. The term “ecocide” has been used by Ukrainian officials to describe the occupiers’ mining practicesjfp.org.uajfp.org.ua. For example, the infamous Yunkom mine (site of a Soviet-era nuclear test) was allowed to flood, raising fears of radioactive contamination spreadingjfp.org.uajfp.org.ua. Locals live with this environmental danger and have no say in the matter. The occupiers’ focus on short-term extraction without investment has left many settlements on the brink of collapse – literally, as uncontrolled mine water causes sinkholes and ground subsidence in some areas.

In summary, the working conditions in occupied Donbas mines are characterized by exploitation and neglect. The coal is extracted at a high human cost: miners labor in perilous conditions for scant reward, essentially fueling the occupiers’ profits under duress. These conditions likely violate the International Labour Organization (ILO) standards and contribute to the classification of Russia’s resource theft as not just a property crime, but an abuse of human rights of the local population.

Legal Assessment: War Crimes and International Law Violations

The systematic theft of Ukraine’s mineral wealth – including coal – by an occupying power contravenes multiple facets of international law. Legal experts and government authorities have pointed to the following violations:

• The Hague Regulations (1907): Under the Hague Convention (IV) and its regulations, an occupying power is prohibited from exploiting the natural resources of occupied territory for its own benefit. Article 55 of the Hague Regulations stipulates that the occupier is only an administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates in occupied territory, and must safeguard the capital of these properties. Wanton extraction of coal for export clearly violates Article 55 – it is effectively pillage, which is forbidden under Article 47szru.gov.ua. Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service explicitly denounced Russia’s coal exports from Mariupol as “a goal-oriented strategy of economic exploitation… in violation of international law and the rules of warfare enshrined in the Hague Conventions.”szru.gov.ua This activity, they note, is a form of “resource colonization” by the occupying powerszru.gov.ua.

• Geneva Conventions – Property Rights and Pillage: The Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) prohibits pillage (Article 33) and demands respect for private property (Article 53 forbids destruction or appropriation of property not justified by military necessity). The coal mines – many of which are state-owned or privately owned under Ukrainian law – have been appropriated without compensation or military need. The ongoing extraction and sale for profit is essentially state-sponsored looting, which qualifies as a war crime of pillage under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Article 8(2)(b)(xvi)). Ukrainian prosecutors are gathering evidence to eventually prosecute individuals involved for war crimes and economic aggression.

• UN General Assembly Resolutions and Sanctions Regimes: The international community has repeatedly affirmed Ukraine’s sovereignty over its territories and resources. U.N. GA Resolution ES-11/1 (2022) and others deplore Russia’s seizures. By selling stolen coal, Russia is also breaching UN-chartered principles against the plunder of natural resources. Furthermore, many of the actors and entities involved (e.g., Donskie Ugli, Stroyservice, and individuals like Medvedchuk, Kurchenko, Yanukovych Jr.) have been placed under sanctions by Ukraine, the U.S., EU, and otherseureporter.coeureporter.co. For example, the U.S. in 2023 sanctioned Stroyservice JSC for being involved in the metals and mining sector feeding Russia’s military machineeureporter.co. The act of laundering Donbas coal through Russian companies was part of the reason for these sanctionseureporter.co. These measures label the trade illicit and seek to legally isolate those responsible.

• Ukrainian Law: On a national level, Ukraine has initiated criminal cases under its penal code for “illegal extraction and smuggling of mineral resources” and even ecocide (Article 441 of Ukraine’s Criminal Code) regarding the flooding of minesjfp.org.uajfp.org.ua. In August 2024, for instance, Ukrainian courts started proceedings in absentia against Russian officials for ecocide in Donbas, citing the irreversible damage caused by mine flooding and resource theftjfp.org.ua. The theft also violates Ukraine’s property and natural resource laws – any contracts or leases issued by the occupation “authorities” are null and void under Ukrainian and international law.

In sum, Russia’s removal of coal from occupied Ukraine is flatly illegal. It constitutes pillage, falls under occupation law violations, and contributes to Russia’s unjust enrichment from aggression – potentially engaging state responsibility for reparations in the future. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba has stated that Russian officials and collaborators involved in the plunder will be held accountable either in Ukrainian courts or international tribunals. The legal consensus is that these actions cannot confer lawful title; all extracted resources (or their equivalent value) remain Ukrainian property, and buyers trafficking in them may face legal consequences for handling stolen goods. The challenge remains enforcement – as long as Russia controls the territory and certain countries accept the coal, the legal remedies are difficult to implement in practice. But documenting these violations now is crucial for future justice and claims for compensation.

Impact on Ukraine’s Coal Industry and Geopolitical Implications

The grand theft of Donbas coal has far-reaching consequences, both for Ukraine’s economy and the broader geopolitical landscape:

• Economic Loss to Ukraine: Donetsk and Luhansk regions traditionally accounted for the bulk of Ukraine’s coal production, especially of anthracite and coking coal grades critical for power generation and steelmaking. With the occupation, Ukraine lost access to most of its anthracite mines (needed for certain power plants) and had to rapidly retool its energy sector. Since 2014, Ukraine invested in converting power stations to use other fuel (gas coal or imported coal) and even in importing coal from as far as South Africa and the U.S. to make up for the shortfall. The direct economic loss from coal theft is enormous: SecDev analytics estimated the total value of all mineral resources under Russian control at $12.4 trillion (coal being a major component)kyivindependent.com. Every ton of coal stolen is a ton Ukraine cannot use or sell. The 120,000+ tons exported via Mariupol in 2024, for example, could have been used to produce thousands of tons of steel for Ukraine’s industry or electricity for its gridszru.gov.ua. Instead, it’s fueling Russia’s war machineszru.gov.ua. Additionally, the destruction and flooding of mines means that even if Ukraine regains control, it will cost billions to restore or safely seal these sites. Some may be permanently lost, a long-term hit to the coal sector.

• Energy Security and Industrial Impact: Before 2014, Ukraine’s metallurgical plants (like those in Mariupol) were fed by local coking coal. Losing the mines forced many steel mills in government-controlled Ukraine to rely on expensive imports or lower-quality substitute inputs. Likewise, thermal power plants in central Ukraine lost their nearest coal sources and had to scramble for fuel – a factor in the rolling blackouts Ukraine faced in 2014–2015. By 2023, Ukraine’s coal power generation was down, but 30% of Ukraine’s electricity was still coal-based (using mines from the free regions and some imports)france24.com. The influx of miners who fled occupied areas to work in free Ukraine helped keep those mines runningfrance24.com, but Ukraine’s coal industry is a fraction of its former self. Essentially, Russia strategically crippled a key Ukrainian industry, not only by direct theft but by denying Ukraine the ability to exploit its own reserveskyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com. This has knock-on effects: Ukraine must invest more in alternative energy and rely on allies for fuel, while dealing with unemployment and social issues in mining communities.

• Financing Russia’s War Effort: For Russia, the stolen coal (and other resources like steel, grain, oil, etc., from occupied areas) provides an additional revenue stream to sustain its war. While coal is not as lucrative as oil/gas, it still contributes. The Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine noted that the coal taken from Mariupol in 2024 could be turned into steel for armored vehicles and ammunitionszru.gov.ua. Indeed, some of the coking coal was directed to Russian steel mills that produce tank armor and shells. Moreover, by selling Donbas coal abroad, Russia effectively gains hard currency that can be used to buy war supplies, all while depleting Ukraine’s assets. It’s a form of economic warfare – “using Ukraine’s natural resources to support [Russia’s] own economy that works for the war,” as the Ukrainian intelligence report put iten.cfts.org.ua. This exacerbates the conflict’s asymmetry and underlines why stopping the resource trade is seen as part of tightening the sanctions regime on Russia.

• Geopolitical Leverage and Sanctions Evasion: The situation has also tested international sanctions and revealed loopholes. The fact that large quantities of “conflict coal” find their way to NATO-allied Turkey has been a diplomatic sticking point. Western countries have pressed Turkey (and others) to close sanctions loopholes; continued imports of such coal undermine the united front against Russia’s aggression. It also puts Turkey in a precarious position: as a Black Sea power, Turkey has tried to balance relations with both Ukraine and Russia. Buying stolen Ukrainian coal (and grain) tilts that balance and can become an issue in Turkey’s relations with the EU and US. In a broader sense, Russia’s ability to sell looted commodities challenges the integrity of the global trading system. It sets a dangerous precedent if an aggressor can profit from occupied territories with limited repercussions. This has implications beyond Ukraine – for example, in how the world might respond to resource looting in other conflicts. It has prompted discussions about tighter tracking of commodity supply chains and perhaps new international norms or “conflict resource” labels (similar to blood diamonds) for coal, steel, and grain coming out of warzones.

• Future Reconstruction and Claims: Looking ahead, Ukraine’s recovery of its territories will include the question of accountability for stolen resources. Kyiv will likely seek legal avenues to claim reparations or compensation. Already, Ukraine is documenting every shipment of coal, grain, and metal that left via Crimea or Mariupol. These records could support claims in international courts or arbitration, demanding that Russia (or the companies involved) pay for what was taken. It’s a complex process – the amounts are huge and enforcement would be hard – but it underscores that Ukraine considers this theft not just a wartime loss but a debt to be settled. The devastated mines will also require international assistance for rehabilitation, and Ukraine may condition any amnesty or business permissions in Donbas on whether companies were involved in the looting. In essence, the coal theft will leave a long shadow over post-war restitution efforts and regional economic reintegration.

Conclusion and Steps Forward

What is unfolding in occupied Donbas is economic pillage on a historic scale. Russia and its proxies have transformed the coal mines of eastern Ukraine from engines of the Ukrainian economy into looted assets financing aggression. The evidence – from specific seized mines (like Shakhtarska-Hlyboka and many others) to shipload after shipload of coal turning up in foreign ports – confirms a coordinated effort to steal Ukraine’s mineral wealth. This operation involves an elaborate cast: oligarchs, insiders, shell companies across jurisdictions, and state-owned infrastructure, all colluding to violate international law.

Countering this will require sustained international focus. Ukraine’s partners can tighten sanctions by targeting the shipping companies (e.g. banning vessels like Alfa-1 and Victoria V from global ports) and penalizing intermediaries (traders, insurers) found to handle stolen resources. Improved satellite and AIS monitoring of the Sea of Azov, and public exposure of each illicit shipment, can raise the cost for the perpetrators. Importing nations, especially Turkey, must be engaged diplomatically to stop enabling the trade in stolen Ukrainian coal. This may involve providing Turkey alternate legitimate sources of coal or other incentives to close the door to contraband. On the legal front, compiling dossiers on individuals like Knyazev, Lisogor, Temerkayev, the Gryzlovs, and Yanukovych Jr. lays groundwork for future prosecution or sanctions if they aren’t already designated.

For Ukraine, the stolen coal saga is both a humanitarian issue (suffering miners and ruined towns) and a rallying point: it underscores that the fight is not only for territory but for the nation’s resources and economic future. Each train of coal seized by Russia is a reminder of why Ukraine resists. And each ton sold on the world market is a test of the world’s resolve to uphold the rules of war and property. As one Ukrainian investigative report aptly titled it, this is “The Black Route of Occupation” – a dark pipeline of theft that must be cut offszru.gov.uaszru.gov.ua. Only by illuminating and disrupting this black market can justice be served and Ukraine’s sovereignty fully restored.

Sources: Ukrainian and international investigative journalism (The Kyiv Independentkyivindependent.comkyivindependent.com, iStoriesistories.mediaistories.media), official statements from Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Serviceszru.gov.uaszru.gov.ua and government, maritime tracking data, leaked customs records, and human rights reports from Donbasjfp.org.uajfp.org.ua, as cited above. These provide a detailed record of the actors, methods, and scale of Russia’s theft of Ukraine’s coal.